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Templates

Oil and gas FLHA template for Canadian field work

An oil-and-gas field-level hazard assessment (FLHA) checks the hazards and controls at the actual workface immediately before a defined task and when conditions change. Use the form below for a particular wellsite, facility, service or pipeline task. It complements the operator's risk assessment, operating procedures, permit-to-work system, isolation plan, pressure-control plan and emergency response plan. It cannot authorise work that those systems have not approved.

There is no single Canadian rule set for every oil-and-gas worksite. A drilling rig, producing facility, pipeline construction spread and maintenance crew face different processes and regulators. Alberta's OHS Code Part 37 applies to specified oil, gas and geothermal exploration, drilling, extraction and related well decommissioning activities in Alberta. The Canada Energy Regulator onshore pipeline framework applies to regulated pipeline companies and their management systems. Neither source turns this generic card into an operator-approved procedure. Identify the asset, operator, jurisdiction and controlling work documents first.

Task and authority block

FieldSite-specific entry
Operator, asset, well/facility/pipeline identifier and exact work area
Employer, contractor, prime-contractor/site authority and contacts
Date, shift, weather, crew and supervisor
Defined task and next steps, including start/finish boundaries
Work order, risk assessment, current procedure and permit references
Equipment/process state and authorised isolation reference
Hazardous substance/SDS and atmospheric-monitoring plan references
Pressure-control and line-opening procedure, if applicable
SIMOPS/nearby operations and affected teams
Emergency plan, muster point, communications and rescue resource
Named person authorised to release, suspend or restart work

Enter not applicable only when the crew knows why. If the task changes from inspection to breaking containment, for example, the original permit and assessment may no longer cover it. Record the change, stop and obtain a new decision from the site's authority. A contractor's own FLHA does not override the operator's permit or energy-control rules.

Conditions at the workface today

Field observationEvidence/control actually checkedDifference from approved method?Action, owner and GO/HOLD
Source of pressure, stored energy or unexpected flow
Line and equipment identification, valves, blinds and isolation
Atmospheric hazard and gas detector suitability/status
Ignition sources, hot work, static and hazardous-area controls
Lifting, mobile equipment, pipe handling and exclusion
Ground, weather, access, egress and slips
Confined space or restricted access boundary
Other trades, production, transfers and simultaneous operations
Spill/environmental containment and public interface
Emergency communications, wind direction and escape route

The field card asks whether the planned controls still match what the workers can see. It should not invite a crew to calculate its own pressure limits, choose respiratory protection from a generic chart or infer that a gas monitor is working because it is switched on. Use the operator's current method, testing and calibration requirements, competent people and permit issuer. If the evidence is missing, hold the task.

Sour-gas and atmosphere gate

Hydrogen sulfide (Hâ‚‚S) may be present in sour operations and is acutely dangerous. CCOHS's hydrogen sulfide profile describes exposure, fire and emergency hazards. Do not rely on odour as an exposure control. Record the site's classification of the atmosphere, the monitoring and alarm plan, the worker training and the applicable escape/rescue arrangements. If an alarm activates or the expected atmosphere changes, follow the site emergency plan. An unprotected coworker must not attempt a rescue. This form deliberately avoids a universal exposure number, detector set-point or respirator selection; those depend on current law, industrial-hygiene assessment and site procedures.

Pressure and hazardous-energy gate

Identify the exact equipment and all energy sources: electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, thermal, gravity, pressure and process contents. Check the authorised isolation and zero-energy verification against the actual line or component, including potential backfeed or trapped pressure. Before a valve or piping component is disassembled in the Alberta Part 37 context, the Code addresses making it safe and controlling pressure hazards. The applicable Part 37 text is the controlling source for Alberta; other work requires its own law and operator procedure. A handwritten “line isolated” entry is not proof. If the system boundary or process state is uncertain, stop and obtain a competent review.

Ignition and simultaneous-operations gate

Map hot work, vehicles, electrical tools, venting, pressure release, transfers and adjacent operations. Check the site's permit coordination and area restrictions. A crew may be fully prepared for its own task while another team changes a valve line-up or begins a nearby lift. Identify who owns the overall simultaneous-operations decision and how one crew will hear of a change. Include the public, landowner or other offsite interface where the work creates one. CER guidance for regulated pipelines emphasises management-system coordination and communication; it does not prescribe one FLHA card for all assets.

Task-step hazard and control record

Today's stepWho could be harmed and how?Control verified at the siteMissing action / ownerGO or HOLD
Arrive, orient and establish work boundary
Inspect asset and verify process state
Isolate, test and prepare work
Perform authorised intervention
Reinstate, test, clear and hand back

Write controls in a way a second person can verify: “permit issuer confirmed current isolation list, tags and zero-energy check for line X” communicates more than “lockout done”. “Gas detector checked under site procedure and continuous monitoring assigned to named role” is better than “monitor gas”. Do not write a control that has only been promised for later as if it is in place now. If a step depends on an operator-authorised permit, engineering design or specialist test, mark it HOLD until the actual record is available and the workface confirms it applies.

Stop-work, escalation and restart

Stop triggerImmediate actionRequired review before restart
Unexpected gas alarm, odour, release or worker symptomLeave danger area; follow emergency planSite authority and competent atmosphere review
Unknown line/equipment or unverified isolationDo not open or energiseCorrect identification, isolation and test
Changed pressure, temperature or flowSuspend intervention and secure areaProcess owner/permit issuer approval
Permit expired, scope changed or conflicting simultaneous taskStop affected stepNew permit/coordination and crew briefing
Failed lifting, fall, ignition or traffic controlMake area safeCompetent correction and verification
Weather or access change affecting escapeWithdraw or pauseEmergency and work method review

Record the stop time, people exposed, safe location, notifications, document revised, control installed, verifier and release time. The site authority decides whether the underlying permit, procedure or risk assessment needs revision. The crew should hear the updated control before restarting. A signature alone is not evidence that a control works.

Crew acknowledgement and example

Briefing promptRecord
Workers identified the highest-consequence exposure in this task
Permit, isolation and emergency plan were understood
Contractor and operator roles were clear
Affected neighbouring workgroups were notified
Everyone knows the stop signal and muster route
Next review trigger/time was agreed

Example: A maintenance crew is assigned to replace an instrument on a producing facility. The permit and line drawing identify the isolation points. On arrival, the crew finds an additional temporary hose connected to the same assembly for another team's testing. The FLHA records the changed process boundary and marks the job HOLD. The process owner identifies the hose, reviews the isolation and pressure-control plan with both teams, revises the permit if required and verifies the system state. Only then is the crew rebriefed and the task released. The field card caught the mismatch; it did not authorise a new isolation scheme.

Review the FLHA after a new shift, crew or work stage and whenever production state, weather, nearby activities, pressure, atmosphere, access or permit scope changes. Alberta OHS Code Part 2 requires site hazard assessment and review at specified change points in Alberta. Do not assume the same wording applies elsewhere.

Existing owner, internal links and Complys boundary

The live Complys Canada hazard-assessment guide owns the general *how to assess hazards* intent, and the Canadian tools directory is an observed tools entry point. This proposed page serves the narrower oil-and-gas task card: asset/process state, pressure, atmosphere, operator/contractor coordination and stop/release. Before publication, check the current repository and unpublished drafts for a closer owner. The manifest's /ca/hazard-assessment-software route was not confirmed live; use the actual verified destination and check the implemented plan. A product-safe CTA is: Ask Complys how current hazard records and corrective actions can be organised around your field work. Do not claim Complys monitors gas, verifies isolation, approves permits or runs an operator's safety management system unless the implementation proves it.

Source, claim, owner, product and writer-side QA register — 5 October 2026

CheckPrimary/observed evidenceDecision / gate
Alberta wellsite-specific orientation, pressure and operational provisionsAlberta OHS Code Part 37Applies only within its defined Alberta scope; same-day local-law check before release.
Alberta formal hazard assessment and revisionAlberta OHS Code Part 2FLHA complements, does not replace, the employer assessment.
Hâ‚‚S exposure/emergency hazardCCOHS hydrogen sulfide profileNo unsupported universal alarm, exposure or PPE thresholds.
Regulated pipeline management-system boundaryCER OPR guidancePipeline-specific; do not imply it governs every wellsite.
Existing owner/cannibalisation and linksCA general hazard guide, CA toolsTask-specific form distinct; unpublished/repo and exact money-route check pending.
Product and copy QAObserved CA entry points; direct answer, blank form, stop/restart and worked exampleREADY writer-side; independent whole-page, canonical, product and jurisdiction QA remains.

Terminal writer-side disposition: READY. No Complys website or repository content was modified.